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LEARNING ABOUT DEMOCRACY AT WORK: EVIDENCE ON THE SOCIETAL EFFECTS OF EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING

Budd, John W.*
Center for Human Resources and Labor Studies
Carlson School of Management
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
jbudd@umn.edu
**presenting author*

Lamare, J. Ryan
Department of Labor Studies and Employment Relations
507A Keller Building
Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA 16802 USA
JRL1095@psu.edu

Timming, Andrew R
School of Management
University of St Andrews
The Gateway, North Haugh
St Andrews, Fife
Scotland
art2@st-andrews.ac.uk

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the extent to which micro-level participation in workplace democracy is linked empirically to macro-level participation in societal democracy using European Social Survey data. OLS and instrumental variables results are both consistent with the hypothesis of "positive upward democratic spillover" from the workplace to the broader society. In contrast with much of the literature that is limited to small samples in a single country, we analyze 15,000 workers across 27 countries. The results are not driven by specific countries, which indicates that this is a general phenomenon across a variety of institutional contexts.

Author Bios

John W. Budd is a Professor of Work and Organizations in the University of Minnesota's Carlson School of Management, where he holds the Industrial Relations Land Grant Chair and is the Director of the Center for Human Resources and Labor Studies. He earned a Ph.D. degree in economics from Princeton University. Professor Budd is the author of *Employment with a Human Face: Balancing Efficiency, Equity, and Voice* (Cornell University Press), *Invisible Hands, Invisible Objectives: Bringing Workplace Law and Public Policy into Focus* (with Stephen Befort, Stanford University Press), *The Thought of Work* (Cornell University Press), and numerous journal articles.

Ryan Lamare is an assistant professor at Penn State's School of Labor and Employment Relations. He received his Ph.D. from Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor Relations. Dr. Lamare's research interests include: labor and employment arbitration, ADR systems in organizations, the role of unions in politics, and employment relations and HR at multinational companies. He has published extensively on these issues in high-quality journals. Dr. Lamare also serves on the editorial board at *Human Resource Management Journal*.

Andrew R. Timming is Reader (U.S.=Associate Professor) in Management at the University of St. Andrews. He is an expert on the role of physical appearance in employee selection and also researches employee participation in decision-making. He has a Ph.D. in economic sociology from the University of Cambridge (Clare Hall). Before joining St Andrews, he was Lecturer in International and Comparative HRM at Manchester Business School. Dr. Timming has two years of industry experience, having served as an HR and strategy consultant for U.S. trade unions. He serves on the editorial boards of *Work, Employment & Society* and *Human Resource Management Journal*.

INTRODUCTION

Scholars have long attempted to assess the extent to which employees' experiences at the workplace shape their wider participation in political activities. In particular, if participatory workplace practices allow workers to develop empowering skills and attitudes, then the workplace may serve as a breeding ground for pro-democratic participation (Pateman 1970). Political scientists, psychologists, and employment relations researchers in particular have used a variety of data and methods to explore this issue over the past several decades. Establishing a link between workplace participation and civic engagement can help inform public policy (Budd and Zagelmeyer 2010) and broader questions regarding the most useful ways in which a society can encourage active political participation among its citizenry. In essence, researchers posit that there is a potential micro-macro link that connects micro-level democratic skills and attitudes within the workplace to macro-level participation in civil society. If this is a causal link from the workplace to the civic arena, then this could be seen as a "positive upward democratic spillover." The most optimistic of the existing scholarship implies that this spillover may hold the key to shaping democratic societies (Greenberg 1986). Moreover, evaluations of organizational management practices typically focus on how they affect organizations and work-related outcomes for individuals; a clearer understanding of any "upward" links between workplace practices and civic engagement can help inform a fuller assessment of alternative human resources systems.

Though the notion that workplace empowerment engenders political voice has strong conceptual and normative appeal, limitations and gaps exist in much of the research into the issue thus far. From a methodological perspective, many studies of workplace and civic participation are narrow in scope and may lack generalizability, particularly outside the U.S. context. The majority of research faces broad challenges on endogeneity grounds, including problems of selection biases, general omitted variable biases, and reverse causality. Several

explorations into the issue are also significantly constrained by their use of very small samples (Jian and Jeffres 2008). Further, from a theoretical perspective, the current state of the field lacks a consensus on whether workplace empowerment is either good or bad for democracy, and some recent studies have gone so far as to suggest that there may be little to no link between workplace participation and political activity (Adman 2008). Relatedly, the majority of studies have paid little to no attention to measuring the extent to which different national institutional environments drive variations in the link between workplace and political participation. In sum, what might at first be seen as a relatively clear question of the extent to which voice on the job shapes voice in the political sphere has become increasingly clouded as scholars have raised methodological and theoretical concerns.

Our study fills several of these gaps confronting those interested in workplace and civic participation. We draw on the European Social Survey to explore a sample of 15,000 workers surveyed across 27 European countries from 2010-2011. We include several measures of both employee voice and democratic participation. The cross-national aspects of the survey and its large size allow us to answer key questions regarding the extent to which findings of a link between workplace voice and societal engagement are driven by particular countries which would imply that this relationship is conditional upon specific institutional contexts. We also use instrumental variables to begin to address the endogeneity concerns that challenge prior studies. In so doing, we are able to contribute to the political science and employment relations literatures in a novel way.

THE WORKPLACE DETERMINANTS OF CIVIC PARTICIPATION: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Two theories dominate the discourse regarding workplace and civic engagement. In both approaches, the ties between happenings in the workplace and experiences in politics are partly predicated on the notion that the two fora are similar such that attitudes and skills are transferable (Almond and Verba 1963). The first theory comes from Pateman (1970), who

argued that employee participation (and autonomy in particular) carries into other contexts, especially with regards to political activities. The spillover effect of workplace participation, in Pateman's view, comes from this participation creating greater *feelings* of confidence and effectiveness, which in turn motivate individuals to participate in activities outside the employment sphere. The second theory, originating in Verba et al. (1995), grounds the spillover effect of workplace participation in the creation of *skills* that can be transferred to the political arena (e.g., letter writing, attending and chairing meetings, or giving speeches). These two theories are similar in postulating a transferability of experiences from the workplace to the political arena, but the Pateman approach assumes that civic participation is governed by political efficacy, while the Verba et al. approach assumes that civic participation is mechanized by specific learned skills.

Pateman's work, along with other similar studies conducted between the 1960s and 1980s (e.g., Dahl 1970) ushered in an era of nuanced empirical scholarship into workplace spillover effects. One of the first major quantitative inquiries into Pateman's theory came from Elden (1981), who explored the association between workplace autonomy and political participation at one non-union western U.S. plant. His study found that feelings of political efficacy, personal potency, and social participation were positively associated with job autonomy and beliefs regarding equity in decision-making at the plant. Small-scale tests of Pateman's hypothesis continued throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s, and drew similar conclusions. Peterson (1992) conducted a survey in Hornell, New York, and, using stepwise regressions, uncovered a link between workplace participation and both voting and protest activities. Burn and Konrad (1987) conducted a similar survey in California, and found that certain civic engagement acts (voting, writing to a politician, campaigning, and protest activity) were associated with job autonomy (as well as other factors).

Later, scholars suggested that Pateman's theory is unidimensional and must be further distilled to consider different dimensions and types of participation. Sobel (1993) found that political participation is affected by variations in the formality of workplace participation (also see Mason 1982). Greenberg et al. (1996), in a re-examination of Greenberg (1986), determined that variations in enterprise-level characteristics moderate the linkages between employment and political participation. Arrighi and Maume (1994) argued that engagement in political activities was not related to routine choices regarding job autonomy, but were instead related to involvement in strategic firm policy decisions. More recently, Jian and Jeffres (2008) found evidence of "boundary spanning" whereby employee involvement and community work participation were associated with wider political efficacy and involvement.

Although informative, all of these results are limited with regards to their research design choices. Specific concerns that manifest in several of these studies include a lack of generalizability coupled with very small sample sizes, as well as the potential for reverse causality and response bias. These studies do little to overcome the limitations of their cross-sectional designs, and are highly U.S.-centric. The Verba et al. approach, and its related articles (e.g., Brady et al. 1995), are advantaged by using a nationally representative sample of U.S. citizens, such as the Citizen Participation Study. This approach is also more viable with regard to sample size, with over 2,000 responses. Further, scholars using the Verba et al. method are sometimes cognizant of the need to incorporate more robust methodologies into their cross-sectional studies (Brady et al. 1995).

The Verba et al. model of learned skills engendering political participation has been refined within the U.S. context to consider differentiation by gender as well as possible selection effects (Schlozman et al. 1999). Scholars have also attempted to explicitly model workplace experiences as functioning uniquely from Verba et al.'s other experiential fora for developing civic skills, such as church activities (Ayala 2000). Such studies bear a

resemblance to Putman's (2000) framework on social capital. Additionally, researchers have uncovered a link between variations in union membership and civic engagement—specifically, union members and activists are more likely to participate in political and other non-workplace civic activities than non-union workers (Bok and Dunlop 1970; Delaney et al. 1988; Radcliff 2001; Schur 2003; Freeman 2003; Lamare 2010; Zullo 2012).

Although these more recent studies have overcome many of the methodological and theoretical concerns confronting earlier work, limitations and gaps remain. First, a significant issue with most prior research into the issue is that the scope remains generally limited to a single country, often the United States. Second, aside from a few studies (e.g., Brady et al. 1995), most of this scholarship has not addressed problems related to endogeneity. Third, although there is a general consensus among most authors that workplace participation is associated with civic activity, the variables used to measure these forms of engagement are inconsistent and depend heavily on whether scholars are primarily interested in featuring the Pateman model or the Verba et al. model.

Only a handful of articles have broached this issue outside the U.S. context. Adman (2008) tested the Pateman and Verba et al. theories within the Swedish context, using panel data. His research, which overcomes many of the problems inherent to cross-sectional approaches, challenges the prior literature in that it finds few, if any, associations between workplace participation and civic activities once panel conditions are applied. However, Adman's work is limited in that it focuses only on Sweden, and uses a short panel (spanning just two rounds).

Godard (2007) compared the extent to which political activities like voting and donating to political or social causes were associated with variations in workplace characteristics (e.g., empowerment, satisfaction, 'high-performance' work systems) in Canada and England. He found several significant associations, though contrary to prior

studies, both job satisfaction and unionization were negatively related to voting. He also uncovered a slight amount of institutional difference between Canada and England. Recognizing the need for a more nuanced account of the role institutional differences play in shaping workplace and civic engagement, Godard (2007: 784) concludes that researchers need to more comprehensively assess the influence of cross-national variations.

Two studies have attempted to assess workplace and political engagement across similar contexts to ours. D'Art and Turner (2007) focus specifically on the relationship between union membership and political participation in 15 European countries using the 2002/2003 European Social Survey. Though they find some evidence of differentiation in both political activism and voting depending on institutional context, they treat institutions as a control and focus on country effects only to the extent that they might moderate unionization outcomes. Lopes et al. (2014) examine the relationship between workplace autonomy and political engagement across 15 European countries found in the European Working Conditions Survey. They consider only Pateman's model and not Verba et al.'s framework, but account for endogeneity by including instrumental variables. Similar to D'Art and Turner, Lopes et al. treat institutional differences largely as controls when assessing political participation. They find that more autonomy is related to greater civic participation, but they are limited in their ability to measure participation (they test only the degree to which a respondent participates in voluntary/charitable activity or in political/union activity, but do not include any additional measures of civic engagement).

In conclusion, the present study makes an original contribution to the extant literature on at least three fronts. First, while most existing studies on political spillover use small samples, we test our model across more than 15,000 workers. Second, whereas the lion's share of research in this area is grounded in the U.S. context, our study stretches across 27 countries, thus allowing us to evaluate the applicability of our theory across different national

institutional contexts. Finally, the present study goes to comparatively greater lengths than most previous research to establish the robustness of our findings (Adman 2008 being an exception).

EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY DATA AND MEASURES

We analyze data from the European Social Survey, Round 5 (hereafter ESS5), which is a cross-national survey of individuals aged 15 and over living in private households. The survey is funded by the European Commission and European Science Foundation, with additional support from the national research councils. ESS5 includes extensive information on indicators of social attitudes and behaviors. It was conducted in 2010-2011 across 27 European countries with an overall sample size in excess of 50,000 individuals, of which approximately 20,000 are workers.[1] Based on the "principle of equivalence" (Jowell 1998), ESS5 is nicely suited for cross-national, comparative studies (Jowell et al. 2007). The research team employed rigorous and systematic methods to minimize nonresponse bias (Stoop et al. 2010), leading to an overall average response rate of 60.8 per cent. The team also followed a translation strategy (European Social Survey 2010) in order to minimize linguistic and semantic discrepancies. The sample "was selected by strict random probability sampling at every stage and the respondents [were] interviewed face-to-face" (European Social Survey 2009: 13).

ESS5 includes nine measures of macro-level political participation in which individual respondents were asked: did you vote in last national legislative election, have you contacted a politician or government official, worked in a political party or action group, wore or displayed a campaign badge or sticker, signed a petition, took part in a lawful public demonstration, boycotted certain products, and do you feel closer to a particular political

[1] The countries represented in ESS5 are Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.

party, and are you a member of a political party. Except for the first and last two questions, the time frame for these questions is within the previous 12 months of the survey. From these nine questions, we also created a political participation score, which is the sum of these questions.

There are also four measures of micro-level workplace participation. Respondents were asked the extent to which the individual respondent can…decide how their own daily work is organized, influence policy decisions about the organization, choose or change their own pace of work, and decide the time they start and finish work. The first three are measured on a 10-point scale, with 1=no influence and 10=complete control. The fourth question is measured on a 4-point scale with 1=not at all true and 4=very true. To construct an overall summary score of individual workplace voice, we convert the 10-point scales to a 4-point scale to match the fourth question, re-normalize each variable to run from 0 to 3, and then aggregate the total. So the overall summary score can range from 0 to 12.

By construction, our focus on these measures of workplace participation limits our sample to ESS5 respondents whose main activity was working at the time of the survey. Moreover, because most of the political participation measures are for the previous 12 months, we further restrict the sample to those who have worked for their current employer for at least a year. Some additional observations are dropped due to missing information, which leaves a primary analysis data set with n=15,392 [note that, due to missing data, the sample sizes are slightly smaller for voted in the last legislative election (n=15,309), feel closer to a party (n=15,678), and the political participation score (n=15,074)]. Sample statistics for the key dependent and independent variables are presented in Table 1. The average within-country sample size is 570, with a range from 252 for Cyprus to 1,103 for Germany.

Having survived a methodologically rigorous survey design process and in the light of hindsight gained from four previous rounds of European Social Surveys, the items in Table 1 are widely considered to be robust measures of the constructs they are meant to reflect. Each of the dependent variables throws light on a dimension of democratic participation in civil society. Taken together, they provide a big picture overview of democratic engagement, broadly conceived. Concomitantly, each of the independent variables is an indicator of employee participation in decision-making. Taken together, they reflect the varying degrees of employee involvement in, and influence over (Strauss 2006: 779), decision-making in the workplace. To return to the two theoretical approaches, however, we admittedly are not able to directly measure either the political efficacy or the skills that result from these individual voice mechanisms. So with respect to this particular nuance, our method is more of a reduced form approach.

From the ESS5, we also construct a number of control variables to include in the multivariate analysis to control for other influences on political participation. These variables include measures of union membership and workplace presence, measures of collective consultation and influence, age, gender, years of education, urban residence, children in the home, citizenship and ethnic minority status, whether the worker is a supervisor, the type of employer (e.g., government or private), employer size, and the worker's major occupation and major industry. We do not report sample statistics or the full results for these variables to save space, but they are available upon request.

BASELINE RESULTS ACROSS 27 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Table 2 summarizes the baseline reports in which two probit models are estimated for each of the key nine dependent variable measures of political participation: the first model only includes the individual voice score, and the second model adds the controls variables described in the previous section plus country effects. We also estimated models with the

four individual voice measures rather than the aggregate score, but for efficiency of reporting, we focus on the aggregate individual voice score here. Column 1 in Table 2 repeats the dependent variable mean for convenience, and column 2 reports the marginal effect and standard error for the individual voice score variable without any other controls. All of the estimates are positive and statistically significant at a 1% level. But these models fail to control for other observable factors that might also shape political participation. As expected, when we control for these observable characteristics, including country fixed effects, the coefficient estimates in column 3 are smaller than in column 2, but all are still positive and statistically significant at a 1% level.

The coefficients reported in columns 2 and 3 indicate the predicted change of the probability of engaging in each of the political behaviors, on average, that is associated with a one-unit increase in the individual voice score. This can be difficult to interpret because this score ranges from 0 to 12. So column 4 in Table 2 reports the implied percent change in the base rate of political activity if the individual voice score goes from its minimum of zero to its maximum of 12 based on the coefficients with controls (column 3). The thought experiment that underlies this calculation is estimating the effect on political participation that would accompany switching an individual's workplace from no individual voice to the maximum amount. As an example, consider the first row (voted in the last national legislative election). If the individual voice score goes from 0 to 12, then the 0.004 coefficient in column 3 Implies that probability of voting increases by 12x0.004 = 0.048, or 4.8 percentage points. Relative to the mean probability of voting of 0.786, this is a 6.1 percent increase. Because the base rate for voting is high, the effect of a large increase in the individual voice score is small. But note carefully that the remaining effects are more sizable, ranging from a 17.9 percent increase in the probability of feeling closer to a particular party to a 72 percent increase in the probability of contacting a politician or government official. As another

(unreported) thought experiment, consider instead increasing the individual voice score by half of its maximum. In this case, the effect sizes in column 4 would be cut in half, but would still be quite significant (e.g., a 20 percent increase in the probability of signing a petition).

It should also be pointed out that if we reverse-code the individual voice variables, then all of the voice estimates would be significantly negative. In other words, dictatorial work—a lack of employee participation and autonomy—is strongly associated with reduced levels of political participation. This is the same result as already developed here, but is another provocative way to think about it.

As another benchmark, it is fairly well-accepted that unions have the strong potential to increase political participation among its members (Lamare 2010; Leighley and Nagler 2007; Radcliff 2001; Radcliff and Davis 2000). So we can compare the estimates for individual voice in Table 2 to the measures of union membership, collective consultation, and influence that are included, but not reported, in column 3. Table 3 reports the strongest results—namely, the indicator variables for whether the respondent is currently a union member and whether there is a trade union in the respondent's workplace. Again, these are from the probit models reported in column 3 of Table 2, so the full set of control variables, including country effects, are included, too. The union member variable is also positive and statistically significant in all of the models whereas the presence of a union in the workplace is significantly related to political participation for five of the political participation dimensions. So, as one would expect based on previous research, trade unions are related to civic engagement, but the effect of individual voice appears just as strong, both statistically and practically. Lastly, we do not find any consistent pattern of interactions between individual voice and various collective voice mechanisms (additional specifications not reported here, but available upon request), so the individual and collective voice relationships with political participation appear distinct.

ARE THE RESULTS DRIVEN BY PARTICULAR COUNTRIES?

As noted above, almost all of the previous literature is limited to single-country studies, and almost all of the research involves the United States. This begs the question as to whether a positive association between individual voice and wider political behavior is driven by particular institutional environments of specific countries. A real advantage of the ESS5 data we are using is the breadth of 27 countries represented, countries that include diverse industrial relations systems, political systems, varieties of capitalism, and other differences.

However, it is unclear how to aggregate various countries based on diverse, blurred categories of different dimensions that might affect the relationship between workplace and political participation, such as the nature of countries' industrial relations and political and economic systems. So instead of an explicit comparative analysis, we adopt a different approach. Specifically, we ask the question, is the relationship between workplace and political participation apparent across a wide range of countries. If so, then we believe it is appropriate to infer that this phenomenon is not limited to a specific institutional context. But while we have a robust sample size across 27 countries, the sample sizes are too small for within-country analyses. So we analyze our question by exploring whether the results are driven by particular countries.

To do this, we start by estimating the results on 27 subsamples that each omit one country from the analyses. With nine dependent variables, this involves 243 models, and yet none yields an estimated individual voice score that is not statistically significant at at least the 5% level (see Table 4). Next, we consider dropping every possible pair of countries. This yields 351 subsamples, and with nine dependent variables, this results in 3,159 models. Only seven of them have p-values > 0.05 for the individual voice score. All except one of them are for the vote in the last national legislative election, and the p-values are all less than 0.10. Lastly, we systematically dropped every unique triplet of countries, for a total of 26,550

regressions. Of them, 150 have individual voice score p-values > 0.05, but that's just 1/2 of one percent. Of them, 103 are for the vote dependent variable, 46 for the lawful demonstrations dependent variable, and one for the wearing a campaign badge dependent variable. Based on this, we feel confident inferring that results in Table 2 are not being driven by a small number of countries. Rather, the relationship between workplace and political participation appears to hold across a wide variety of European countries with diverse institutional environments. This is an important result because it shows that the models are generally robust cross-nationally.

ARE THE RESULTS DRIVEN BY REVERSE CAUSALITY OR ENDOGENEITY?

Bryson et al. (2013) clearly lay out the multiple causal paths that might explain an empirical relationship between union membership and political behaviors. The same logic applies to the nexus between workplace individual voice and political participation. The theorizing in the literature in which individual voice mechanisms create skills and agency that spillover into the political arena implies a straightforward causal relationship from the workplace to the political arena. But a reverse causality relationship is also possible, such that workers gain skills and agency through political participation which then leads to a desire for greater autonomy and voice in the workplace. As a third possibility, workers might vary on their predisposition towards voice and agency, and workers with higher levels of this trait seek out workplaces with voice and simultaneously seek out opportunities for political engagement.

While our empirical results show a strong empirical association between workplace voice and political participation, these alternative causal mechanisms indicate that our results do not necessarily reveal a causal relationship from the workplace to the political sphere. It is therefore important to explicitly investigate the possibility of reverse causality or endogeneity. A standard approach in this type of situation is the use of instrumental variables

(IV). To do this, we need instruments that are correlated with individual voice but not political participation. We use two variables from the European Social Survey dataset: 1) how easy or difficult is it for a worker's immediate boss to know how much effort they put into their work (0=extremely difficult to 10=extremely easy), and 2) how easy or difficult is it for a worker's employer to replace them if they left (0=extremely difficult to 10=extremely easy). We posit that these could be related to employee involvement structures, but it is hard to see why they would affect whether or not one participates in the political arena. An F-test for the instruments in the first stage regression yields an F-statistic of 100.012, which is well-above the conventional threshold of 10, so this evidence does not suggest that we have problems with weak instruments.

The results are presented in Table 5. Column 1 reports baseline OLS estimates, which are very similar to those reported in Table 2, albeit with slight differences due to a different sample size (due to missing values for the instruments) and because these are OLS instead of probit estimates. Only the estimated coefficient and standard error for the individual voice score are reported, but the models include a full set of controls as described earlier in the paper. Column 2 reports the coefficient and standard error for the individual voice score from an instrumental variables model using the difficulty of observing work effort and of being replaced as instruments. For each of the nine measures of political participation, the IV estimate is larger than the OLS coefficient which suggests that the OLS estimates are not an artefact of reverse causality or endogeneity. Admittedly, the IV estimate is not statistically significant in several cases, but this reflects larger standard errors when estimated using instruments, which is typically the case with IV estimation; the lack of statistical significance does not stem from a smaller IV coefficient compared to the relevant OLS estimates.

Column 3 reports the p-values for the Hausman-Wu test of endogeneity, and column 4 reports the p-values from a Sargan overidentification test. For most of the measures of

political participation, the Hausman-Wu test p-values are large which suggests that endogeneity is not a problem. The two smallest p-values are for contacted a politician or government official and took part in a lawful public demonstration, and in both of these cases the IV estimate is statistically significant and larger than the OLS coefficient. In the latter case, however, the small p-value for the Sargan test suggests that our instruments are not valid in this specification. More analyses are planned, but our general conclusion is that endogeneity issues do not seem to heavily affect our results, which is supported by similar studies of this type (see Lopes et al. 2014). The most conservative interpretation might be that there are some effects of endogeneity on attitudes and behaviors toward parties, as well as public protest activities (demonstrations and boycotts). But, for many of the staples of democratic participation (voting, contacting government officials, showing support for a candidate, signing a petition), accounting for reverse causality and endogeneity using instrumental variables still generates a positive and significant effect of individual workplace voice consistent with an apparent causal mechanism leading from the workplace to the political arena.

CONCLUSIONS

For decades, scholars and others have argued that the workplace, when structured appropriately, can serve as a training ground for democracy by fostering a sense of agency as well as transferable skills. In other words, there are reasons to expect that what happens at work, does not stay at work. This can be seen in a positive frame—greater workplace involvement is likely to be associated with greater political engagement—or in a negative frame—dictatorial and authoritarian workplace practices are likely to be related to reduced political participation. But while there has been empirical research testing these relationships, there are still some gaps in the literature.

In a cross-section of 15,000 European workers, we find that employees with greater levels of individual voice are indeed significantly more likely to engage in a broad array of democratic behaviors. This relationship appears just as strong as the commonly-accepted relationship between trade unions and political participation, and appears to be a distinct relationship apart from this collective voice sphere. Moreover, we find these results in arguably the broadest analyses of diverse countries to date. We further show that the results do not appear to be driven by a small number of specific countries. As such, we believe that the relationship between workplace and political democracy is one that holds across diverse countries, and hence across diverse institutional environments. This is a unique result that moves the literature on the political spillovers of organizational policies forward in an important way.

The evidence presented here is therefore consistent with a positive upward democratic spillover. But we need to recognize that there is the potential that individuals who value democratic participation seek out jobs that allow for workplace participation. In other words, democratic engagement in civil society might precede workplace democracy both temporally and causally. We use instrumental variables estimation to rigorously investigate the possibility of reverse causality and endogeneity issues. While more work in this regard is needed, our results to-date suggest that endogeneity is not a major issue. Even if one takes this conclusion as tentative, the results presented here are significant for demonstrating the broad applicability of the association between workplace practices and political behaviors. Regardless of which direction the causal arrow ultimately points, this is an important result. If workplace practices shape political participation, then the importance of organizational practices is magnified beyond their workplace and organizational effects, and public policy interventions might be warranted to prevent dictatorial work that dampens political engagement. Alternatively, if causality runs the other way, then this implies that the

workplace can be an important outlet for individuals valuing political involvement, and the availability of desirable organizational practices can be good for a democracy by possibly preventing these engaged individuals from getting frustrated or losing their deliberative skills, and thus reducing the likelihood that they withdraw from the political arena. In either case, the workplace-civic society nexus appears to be an important one that deserves greater attention in the public policy arena.

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Table 1: Key Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics

Variable (ESS question number)	Scale	Mean	Std Dev
Dependent Variables (measures of political participation)			
Voted in last national legislative election (B11)	0=no, 1=yes	0.786	0.410
Contacted politician or government official (B13)	0=no, 1=yes within last 12 months	0.150	0.357
Worked in a political party or action group (B14)	0=no, 1=yes within last 12 months	0.041	0.198
Wore or displayed a campaign badge/sticker (B16)	0=no, 1=yes within last 12 months	0.077	0.267
Signed a petition (B17)	0=no, 1=yes within last 12 months	0.233	0.423
Took part in a lawful public demonstration (B18)	0=no, 1=yes within last 12 months yes	0.069	0.254
Boycotted certain products (B19)	0=no, 1=yes within last 12 months	0.164	0.370
Feel closer to a particular political party (B20a)	0=no, 1=yes	0.469	0.499
A member of a political party (B21)	0=no, 1=yes	0.043	0.203
Political participation score (sum of nine questions above)	0=min to 9=max	2.053	1.555
Key Independent Variables (measures of individual workplace voice)			
Decide how own daily work is organized (F27)	0=no influence to 10=complete control	6.117	3.322
Influence policy decisions about organization (F28)	0=no influence to 10=complete control	3.800	3.249
Choose or change own pace of work (F28a)	0=no influence to 10=complete control	5.642	3.386
Decide the time they start and finish work (G31)	1=not at all true; 2=a little true; 3=quite true; 4=very true	1.800	1.041
Individual voice score (sum of four questions above, with 10-point scales first converted to 4)	0=min to 12=max	5.076	3.256

Source: European Social Survey, Round 5 (2010/11), sample of individuals whose main activity in the last 7 days was working, and worked for employer ≥ 1 year [n=15,392, except for voted in last legislative election (n=15,309), feel closer to a party (n=15,678), and the political participation score (n=15,074)].

Table 2: Baseline Probit Results of the
Effect of Individual Workplace Voice on Political Participation

		Individual Voice Score[a]		
Dependent Variable	Dep Var Mean (1)	Without Controls (2)	With Controls (3)	Voice "Effect"[b] (4)
Voted in last national legislative election	0.786	0.016** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.061
Contacted politician or government official	0.150	0.017** (0.001)	0.009** (0.001)	0.720
Worked in a political party or action group	0.041	0.005** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.585
Wore or displayed a campaign badge/sticker	0.077	0.009** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.468
Signed a petition	0.233	0.021** (0.001)	0.008** (0.001)	0.412
Took part in a lawful public demonstration	0.069	0.004** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.348
Boycotted certain products	0.164	0.017** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.293
Feel closer to a particular political party	0.469	0.024** (0.001)	0.007** (0.002)	0.179
Member of a political party	0.043	0.004** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.558

Source: European Social Survey, Round 5 (2010/11), sample of individuals whose main activity in the last 7 days was working, and worked for employer ≥ 1 year [n=15,392, except for voted in last legislative election (n=15,309), feel closer to a party (n=15,678), and the political participation score (n=15,074)].

Notes: [a] Columns 2 and 3 report the marginal effect and standard error for the individual voice score from a probit model for each dependent variable. See text for listing of control variables. Models are estimated using ESS5 design weights.

[a] Column 4 reports the implied percent change in the base rate of political activity if the individual voice scores goes from its min (0) to its max (12) based on the coefficients with controls (column 3).

Statistically significant at the * 0.05 or ** 0.01 level.

Table 3: Comparing the Effect of Individual and Collective Workplace Voice Measures on Political Participation

	Individual Voice Score[a]		Collective Voice Measures	
Dependent Variable	Marginal Effect (s.e.) (1)	Voice "Effect" (2)	Is a Union Member (3)	Trade Union in Workplace (4)
Voted in last national legislative election	0.004** (0.001)	0.061	0.041** (0.010)	0.013 (0.009)
Contacted politician or government official	0.009** (0.001)	0.720	0.032** (0.008)	0.027** (0.009)
Worked in a political party or action group	0.002** (0.001)	0.585	0.019** (0.004)	0.008 (0.004)
Wore or displayed a campaign badge/sticker	0.003** (0.001)	0.468	0.027** (0.005)	0.017** (0.006)
Signed a petition	0.008** (0.001)	0.412	0.059** (0.010)	0.048** (0.011)
Took part in a lawful public demonstration	0.002** (0.001)	0.348	0.036** (0.005)	0.005 (0.006)
Boycotted certain products	0.004** (0.001)	0.293	0.023** (0.008)	0.045** (0.009)
Feel closer to a particular political party	0.007** (0.002)	0.179	0.035** (0.013)	0.036** (0.013)
Member of a political party	0.002** (0.001)	0.558	0.019** (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)

Source: European Social Survey, Round 5 (2010/11), sample of individuals whose main activity in the last 7 days was working, and worked for employer ≥ 1 year [n=15,392, except for voted in last legislative election (n=15,309), feel closer to a party (n=15,678), and the political participation score (n=15,074)].

Notes: [a] Columns 1 and 2 are from columns 3 and 4 in Table 2. Columns 3 and 4 report the marginal effect and standard error for two collective voice measures score from a probit model for each dependent variable. See text for listing of control variables. Models are estimated using ESS5 design weights.

Statistically significant at the * 0.05 or ** 0.01 level.

Table 4: Are the Results Driven By Particular Countries?

	Number of Models with Individual Voice Score p-value < 0.05		
Dependent Variable	Omitting One Country at a Time (1)	Omitting Two Countries at a Time (2)	Omitting Three Countries at a Time (3)
Voted in last national legislative election	27	345	2,849
Contacted politician or government official	27	351	2,952
Worked in a political party or action group	27	351	2,952
Wore or displayed a campaign badge/sticker	27	351	2,951
Signed a petition	27	351	2,952
Took part in a lawful public demonstration	27	350	2,906
Boycotted certain products	27	351	2,952
Feel closer to a particular political party	27	351	2,952
Member of a political party	27	351	2,952
Number of Country Combinations	27	351	2,952

Table 5: Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Effect of Individual Workplace Voice on Political Participation[a]

Dependent Variable	OLS (1)	IV (2)	Hausman-Wu test p-value (3)	Sargan overid test p-value (4)
Voted in last national legislative election	0.004* (0.001)	0.021* (0.010)	0.597	0.171
Contacted politician or government official	0.008* (0.001)	0.024* (0.009)	0.025	0.233
Worked in a political party or action group	0.003* (0.001)	0.006 (0.005)	0.492	0.613
Wore or displayed a campaign badge/sticker	0.003* (0.001)	0.014* (0.007)	0.331	0.775
Signed a petition	0.007* (0.001)	0.019 (0.011)	0.459	0.217
Took part in a lawful public demonstration	0.003* (0.001)	0.013* (0.007)	0.150	0.206
Boycotted certain products	0.004* (0.001)	0.019* (0.009)	0.216	0.002
Feel closer to a particular political party	0.005* (0.002)	0.020 (0.012)	0.236	0.003
Member of a political party	0.004* (0.001)	0.004 (0.005)	0.966	0.213

Source: European Social Survey, Round 5 (2010/11), sample of individuals whose main activity in the last 7 days was working, and worked for employer ≥ 1 year (n=14,484).

Notes: [a] Column 1 reports the OLS coefficient and standard error for the individual voice score. Column 2 reports the IV estimates using difficulty of observing work effort and of being replaced as instruments. See text for listing of control variables. Models are estimated using ESS5 design weights. Columns 3 and 4 report the p-values for the Hausman-Wu test of endogeneity and the Sargan overidentification test. These are calculated from unweighted instrumental variables regressions using the same specifications.

Statistically significant at the * 0.05 level.